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ADDICTION, ARROGANCE, AND AGGRESSION: 
THE QUESTION OF ATTITUDE IN THE FIRST OPIUM WAR 
 
By C. Claire Summers 
 
“We [Britain] seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the 
world in a fit of absence of mind.” –J. R. Seeley, 18831 
 
The nineteenth century was an era of resurgent expansion for 
Britain. The development of the British Empire was once again in full 
force, and this was one of the most influential factors in the formation of 
the British cultural mentality during this time. This neo-imperialism in 
Britain created a sharp increase in patriotic and apparently benevolent 
sentiment—the idea that the British Empire was the pinnacle of modernity, 
and that it could be only generous to spread its rule to other parts of the 
world. The British extended the reach of their Empire in the nineteenth 
century not only through military conquest, but through trade as well. One 
of the areas that fell under British influence during this period was China, 
whose isolationist foreign policy differed dramatically from Britain’s. The 
British inserted themselves into the Chinese economy by means of the 
opium trade, which served to support the British addiction to that coveted 
Chinese substance, tea. The meeting of these two cultures created a 
dangerously charged political situation that culminated in violence with the 
beginning of what has become known as the First Opium War in 1839. 
Historical interpretations of this conflict’s origins varied considerably 
throughout the decades since its occurrence, and many focused on the 
development of the opium-tea trade as the primary cause. To grasp the 
story in its entirety, however, it is necessary to widen the historical scope 
beyond the influence of opium itself. While the opium trade was both the 
immediate cause and primary catalyst of the First Opium War, from a 
greater historical distance it appears that the war was largely the result of 
an attitude collision: on the one hand the cavalier indifference of British 
imperial officials, and on the other the cultural superiority of the Chinese 
government.  
                                                             
1 J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England, 1883 (Reprint, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1971): 12. 
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Lawrence James, a historian of the British Empire, neatly 
summarized the paradox of their imperial mindset in his Rise and Fall of 
the British Empire: “[Empire] encouraged a sense of superiority… It also 
fostered racial arrogance. And yet at the same time, deeply-rooted liberal 
and evangelical ideals produced a powerful sense of imperial duty and 
mission.”2 These various factors combined with a burgeoning sense of 
nationalism, fostered by victory over Napoleon earlier in the century, to 
create a strange dichotomy in which Britain desired good for its colonies 
and dependencies and yet felt little compulsion to work to understand their 
cultural differences—as tales of the first diplomatic contact between 
Britain and China plainly reveal.3  
The first British ambassador to China was Lord George 
Macartney, an experienced and distinguished young diplomat who had 
recently completed a successful term as the governor of Madras in British 
India.4 His posting in China, however, would not prove so effective. He 
arrived in 1792 on a mission to initiate diplomatic contact between the two 
countries, and the sign affixed to his boat by his Chinese escorts clearly 
illustrated the fundamental misunderstanding between these two countries. 
It read, in effect: “Tribute-bearer from England.”5 China was not 
accustomed to negotiating with foreign nations; rather, they were used to 
accepting tribute from the other Asian countries that rested in their 
enormous shadow.6 The British, however, clearly had a very limited 
knowledge of Chinese culture and anticipated no such thing. British 
tradition involved presenting gifts to a foreign prince, but always with the 
understanding that the gifts were offered as a sign of respect and not as a 
way of paying homage to a superior power. Tensions increased during 
Macartney’s audience with the Emperor, particularly over what would 
become one of the primary illustrations of the British-Chinese culture 
clash: the kowtow. 
                                                             
2 Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (New York: St. 
Martin’s Griffin, 1994), xiv. 
3 W. Travis Hanes III and Frank Sanello, The Opium Wars: The Addiction of 
One Empire and the Corruption of Another (Naperville: Sourcebooks, Inc., 2002), 13-
16. See pages 3-4 for additional explanation. 
4 Ibid., 14. 
5 “The Reception of the First English Ambassador to China, 1792,” ed. Paul 
Halsall, Internet History Sourcebook: Modern, (Accessed April 11, 2015). 
6 Hanes and Sanello, 15. 
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Any foreign visitor to the Chinese court, upon arrival, was 
required to perform the kowtow before the emperor—that is, to bow, kneel, 
and place forehead to floor nine times. It seemed that Macartney would 
have readily performed this ritual, but only if the emperor made the same 
gesture in return before a portrait of King George III. In the end, neither 
party conceded and the visit drew to a close. Although this incident caused 
no major repercussions, the British envoy returned from China without 
making any real diplomatic progress. This alone would probably have been 
forgotten as a simple misunderstanding, were it not for the second British 
attempt a few decades later that proved even less productive and generated 
more tension than the first. Lord Amherst, the British ambassador to China 
sent in 1816, flatly refused to kowtow and apparently offered no potential 
solutions to this quandary. Although the Chinese government worked to 
come up with a compromise, they could not seem to find a remedy that 
satisfied both sides and the situation ended in a stalemate. Amherst was 
denied audience with Emperor Jiaqing and eventually returned to Britain; 
the only accomplishment was the bruised egos of both empires.7 These two 
incidents combined were representative of the irreconcilable differences 
between Britain and China. The problems could likely have been averted if 
the British had put forth more effort to understand the mindset of the 
Chinese, or if the Chinese had been able to step back and meet with the 
British ambassadors as equals rather than tribute-bearing barbarians.8 
China and Britain both exhibited a similar cultural arrogance that 
accompanied the development of a stable empire. China, however, had 
solidified their empire much earlier (many historians agree that Imperial 
China began with the Qin dynasty in the third century BC) and had 
established themselves as the peak of civilization in the Far East.
9
 As a 
result of this cultural superiority, the Chinese government generally viewed 
foreigners as barbarians.10 China had shut down foreign trade in an attempt 
to keep Chinese society pure. This perturbed the British, who had 
developed a love for tea (at that point only available in China) and a belief 
7 Summary of these diplomatic meetings drawn from Hanes and Sanello 
(14-24) and “The Reception of the First English Ambassador to China, 1792.” 
8 Toby & Will Musgrave, An Empire of Plants: People and Plants that 
Changed the World (London: Cassell & Co, 2000): 123. 
9 C. P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1964): 1-2. 
10 Hanes and Sanello, xii. 
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that they had a “right to conduct unrestricted trade throughout the world.”11 
Indeed, John Quincy Adams, still not far removed from the British Empire 
himself, called the Chinese system “churlish and unsocial.”12 Their 
divergent mentalities seemed diplomatically irreconcilable, portending 
Kipling’s words from 1889: “Oh, East is East and West is West, and never 
the twain shall meet.”13 Cultural attitudes planted the seed for the 
nineteenth-century trade conflict that eventually sparked the First Opium 
War.  
India was, without doubt, the largest supplier of opium for the 
Chinese. By the 1800s, however, the title “India” as an administrative term 
referred for all practical purposes to the British East India Company. This 
meant that the true regulation of the opium trade rested not with the native 
government of India, but with the British. This opium traffic began as a 
gradual trade process not unlike that of any other commodity, such as 
tobacco. China’s appetite for opium grew exponentially with the discovery 
that smoking the leaves produced a more intense hallucinogenic experience 
than alternate methods of consumption.14 This newly developing method of 
opium consumption rendered the user almost completely inert while under 
the influence and provoked higher addiction rates with much more 
debilitating withdrawal symptoms than eating or drinking the drug.15 
Naturally, as Chinese dependency on the drug grew in the early nineteenth 
century, demand for the product increased rapidly and the East India 
Company rose to the occasion with enthusiasm.  
                                                             
11 James, 236. 
12 John Quincy Adams, “Lecture on the War with China, delivered before 
the Massachusetts Historical Society, December 1841,” in The Chinese Repository 
vol. XI (Canton: Printed for the proprietors, 1842): 277. 
13 Rudyard Kipling, 1889. Reprint: The Collected Poems of Rudyard Kipling 
(London: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1994): 245. This quote is taken out of context 
of the spirit of Kipling’s poem, but the idea is useful in this instance. 
14 In both Western and Eastern countries opium was frequently prescribed as 
a medical aid to treat nervous disorders, general pains, and really almost anything. In 
the West it was generally administered as part of a mixture of medicines; laudanum 
was one of the most common forms of an opium remedy. The use of opium in a 
restorative capacity led to many instances of both inadvertent addiction and 
exacerbation of medical issues. [Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War 1840-1842: 
Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part of the Nineteenth Century and 
the War by Which They Forced Her Gates Ajar (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1975): 7-8.] 
15 Fay, 8-10. 
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Tea was the other essential component of the Chinese-British 
trading relationship. Britain had first been exposed to this drink in the mid-
seventeenth century, and by the nineteenth century tea consumption in 
Britain had increased dramatically.16 At that point China was virtually the 
only source of these leaves to which the British had become so attached.17 
In fact, by the late eighteenth century China was supplying Britain with 
fifteen million pounds of tea each year,18 creating a significant trade 
imbalance since the British had very little to offer that the Chinese desired. 
China would only accept payment in the form of silver, placing enormous 
strain on the British economy as the government and merchants worked to 
keep their citizens supplied with their beverage of choice. China’s growing 
dependence on opium proved to be the answer to their economic woes, 
since Britain had gained control of the opium industry through the 
incorporation of India into the Empire.19 Opium seemed the most workable 
solution to the trade impasse: the British would export the drug from India 
to China, sell it for silver, and use their profits to purchase tea from China. 
This triangular trade that developed between Britain, India, and China set 
the stage for the Anglo-Chinese conflict, further illustrating how the 
countries’ attitudes toward each other were the underlying causes of the 
open warfare that was to come.  
Although the East India Company initially wanted to avoid 
engaging in illegal trade in China, by the end of the eighteenth century the 
economic pressures proved too great for them to continue ignoring such a 
large potential for profit.20 The Company began selling opium outright to 
the Chinese but soon realized that, as an official agency of the British 
government, it was bad foreign policy for them to directly contravene the 
Chinese government’s 1799 opium ban.21 The British found a morally 
dubious technicality that allowed them to circumvent this prohibition. The 
Company began auctioning off the opium to private British merchants in 
Calcutta with, in the words of Roy Moxham, “no questions asked as to its 
                                                             
16 Hanes and Sanello, 20. 
17 Roy Moxham, Tea: Addiction, Exploitation, and Empire (New York: 
Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2003): 64. 
18 Hanes and Sanello, 20. 
19 Ibid., 20. 
20 Ibid., 20. 
21 Ibid., 21. 
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final destination.”22 The independent traders would then transport the 
opium to China for illicit sale and use the profits to bring precious tea back 
to England. Placing the responsibility of the actual buying and selling in 
the hands of private citizens essentially absolved the British government of 
any technical liability. This trade situation was a clear example of Britain’s 
cavalier attitude toward imperialism. They did not maliciously plan to 
create a nationwide addiction to a hallucinogenic drug; the trade developed 
as a matter of expediency, and they allowed it to happen as they followed 
opportunities to achieve their economic ends without any in-depth 
consideration of the human cost. This method worked for several decades, 
and as addiction levels in China swiftly rose, so did the concern of the 
Chinese government. 
Serious misgivings about the growth of the opium trade developed 
in the Chinese government several decades before the issue came to a head 
in military conflict. Already dubious about permitting interaction with 
foreign traders, the Chinese government had restricted external merchant 
access to the city of Canton by the time the British paid their first official 
diplomatic visit.23 Beginning in 1760, Chinese officials established an 
official trading season from October to May every year, prohibited 
foreigners from interacting with Chinese citizens without official 
supervision, and forbade all foreign merchants from learning Chinese.24 
This “Canton System” remained in place until the end of the First Opium 
War, but had little effect on the influx of the drug into Chinese society; 
merchants had only to bribe the Chinese trade administrators and the trade 
continued to flourish, worsening diplomatic tensions.25  
As the British rashly pressed their trade advantage, China still 
refused to engage with the world around them, which was evolving into a 
progressively more globalized society. Chinese officials could not, 
however, ignore the negative effects of the foreign opium trade on their 
society. Opium had become so popular that by the early 1800s the 1760 
government ban on its trade had almost no effect.26 In 1820 Chinese opium 
                                                             
22 Moxham, 67. 
23 Musgrave, 123. 
24 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1970): 120. 
25 Musgrave, 126. 
26 Carl A. Trocki, Opium, Empire, and the Global Political Economy: A 
Study of the Asian Opium Trade 1750-1950 (New York: Routledge, 1999): 92-97. 
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imports reached a level of 4,000 chests a year (over 350,000 pounds) and a 
decade later that number increased to 18,000 chests (2.5 million pounds) at 
an annual cost of £2.2 million.27 This soon prompted drastic action from 
the government, especially after another, more severe prohibition edict 
failed to effect any noticeable change. The conflict began in earnest in 
1838 with the appointment of Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu (or Tse-
Hu).28 
Commissioner Lin was under strict orders from the Emperor to 
find a way to curtail the opium problem.29 In the years before his 
appointment the government had waved aside suggestions to appeal 
directly to the British Crown, but by 1839 the problem had grown bad 
enough that Lin decided to try.30 He wrote a letter to Queen Victoria 
stating in no uncertain terms how much the Chinese government detested 
the opium trade and admonishing Victoria to cease immediately or risk 
severe consequences.31 Lin’s language in this letter exhibited a good deal 
of the cultural superiority typical of imperial China, referring to China as 
the “Inner Land” or “Center Land” and saying, “Our celestial empire rules 
over ten thousand kingdoms! Most surely do we possess a measure of 
godlike majesty which ye cannot fathom!”32 He also, however, made some 
comments that directly struck the heart of the matter:  
We find that your country is distant from us about sixty or 
seventy thousand miles, that your foreign ships come hither 
striving the one with the other for our trade, and for the 
simple reason of their strong desire to reap a profit. Now, 
out of the wealth of our Inner Land, if we take a part to 
bestow upon foreigners from afar, it follows, that the 
immense wealth which the said foreigners amass, ought 
properly speaking to be portion of our own native Chinese 
people. By what principle of reason then, should these 
foreigners send in return a poisonous drug, which involves 
27 Trocki, 94; Moxham, 69. 
28 Arthur Waley, The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1958): 12. 
29 Ibid., 12. 
30 Ibid., 27-28. 
31 Lin Zexu, “Commissioner Lin: Letter to Queen Victoria, 1839,” ed. Paul 
Halsall, Internet History Sourcebook: Modern (accessed 25 April 2015). 
32 Ibid. 
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in destruction those very natives of China? 33 Without 
meaning to say that the foreigners harbor such destructive 
intentions in their hearts, we yet positively assert that from 
their inordinate thirst after gain, they are perfectly careless 
about the injuries they inflict upon us!34 
Commissioner Lin voiced within these lines his own view of British 
imperial haphazardness: that the British had, in their pursuit of economic 
gain, inadvertently created an addiction that crippled an entire country. 
China had become a branch of Britain’s informal economic empire. Lin 
went on to inform the Queen that new severe penalties had been attached to 
the trafficking of opium: foreign merchants caught selling opium would be 
beheaded, and all property aboard their ships seized. These new terms did 
offer a period of grace during which any merchants who voluntarily 
surrendered their illicit cargo would be spared the death penalty.35 
Common historical agreement indicates that although Queen Victoria 
never received Commissioner Lin’s letter, the British were made aware of 
the Chinese government’s new terms through other outlets.36 
Commissioner Lin resolutely implemented his new policies. He 
immediately confiscated and destroyed any opium or drug paraphernalia 
found in China and arrested hundreds of Chinese users and dealers in the 
Canton area.37 Eventually, after the attempted arrest of several prominent 
British merchants (one of whom he planned on beheading to serve as an 
example), Lin blockaded the British into their factories at Canton. Only 
after the British merchant ships off the coast of Canton surrendered all 
their contraband opium did Lin finally allow them to leave the city and 
return home. This hostage situation and temporary surrender dealt a severe 
blow to British pride. The incident, combined with Lin’s use of tactics 
Britain considered underhanded such as poisoning wells and cutting off 
                                                             
33 Lin also mentions later in the letter that the British should not sell a 
substance in China that is illegal in their own country. In fact, though this was difficult 
to research, it does not seem as though there were any laws prohibiting opium in 
Britain at this time. It is likely that this was because smoking opium was uncommon 
there during this period. Most people took it medicinally, as mentioned earlier. This is 
not to say that the British did not have an opium problem; addiction and overdoses 
were very common. 
34 Lin Zexu, “Letter to Queen Victoria.” 
35 Ibid. 
36 Hanes and Sanello, 40-41. 
37 Ibid., 41. 
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food supplies, eventually led to the opening shots of the First Opium War 
in September of 1839.38 
The conflict began as a direct result of Lin’s attempted arrest of 
British citizens and his refusal to allow British ships to access food and 
supplies. After warning the Chinese that they would attack if not allowed 
to resupply, the British fired on the Chinese war junks that were blocking 
access to Hong Kong.39 This first minor battle resulted in a dubious success 
for the Chinese—they far outnumbered the British, and were therefore able 
to fend them off long enough to put an end to the brief confrontation. The 
Chinese government, however, received a dramatically exaggerated 
account of this battle as a wondrous victory over the barbarians.40 Jack 
Beeching, author of The Chinese Opium Wars, commented that this kind of 
hyperbole both exemplified China’s superior attitude and hindered the 
Chinese government from receiving reliable information about the war. 
Beeching observed, “The passionate anti-foreign sentiment being aroused 
in Canton by the scholars who followed Lin’s lead was from now on to hail 
any major setback to the foreign devils as a Smashing Blow.”41 The war 
had finally begun in earnest, and due to China’s inward focus government 
officials had no idea of the damage the British were capable of inflicting. 
Although the decision to force open Chinese trade was met with 
substantial debate, Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston largely quashed 
British concerns in Parliament.42 Palmerston, who had been instrumental in 
the development of trade with China and in the unfolding of the opium 
conflict, was adamant that China should open its gates to foreign nations. 
He employed his skills as a politician and orator to rally the support of the 
Parliamentary majority, and soon raised the necessary support to send a 
British Navy force to Canton in response to these perceived injustices.
43
  
Before long the British had taken Hong Kong and mounted a campaign up 
the Yangtze River, ultimately capturing Shanghai.44 China’s outdated 
                                                             
38 Summary of Lin’s response taken from Hanes and Sanello, 41-66. 
39 Jack Beeching, The Chinese Opium Wars (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1975): 90-91. 
40 Beeching, 92. 
41 Ibid., 92. 
42 One of the most vocal opponents to not only the war but the opium trade 
as a whole was William Gladstone, who would later become Prime Minister several 
years after Palmerston himself. 
43 Beeching, 108-111. 
44 James, 237. 
TENOR OF OUR TIMES  Spring 2016 
12 
military technology was far inferior to Britain’s, and after three years the 
Chinese were forced to surrender. 
The Treaty of Nanking (Nanjing), signed to bring the hostilities to 
a close, was a humiliating blow for China, who was forced to fully cede 
Hong Kong to the British, as well as open five other “treaty ports” where 
Western merchants could trade freely. The treaty also abolished the Canton 
System and required China to pay full reparations for the opium that had 
been confiscated or destroyed. Britain did not push for the legitimization of 
the opium trade; at that point popular objections in both China and Britain 
were vocal enough to prevent this. The treaty, however, was disingenuous; 
in fact, even the continued ban on opium facilitated British interests since 
they retained a monopoly on the illegal opium trade in China.45  
The crux of the conflict between Britain and China was evident in 
the terms of the Treaty of Nanking. The catalyst of the war—the 
regulations on the opium trade—technically did not change as a result of 
the treaty. Although British opium sales continued to flourish, more 
importantly Britain had accomplished the greater goal of undermining 
Chinese isolationism and autonomy. The imperial edicts forbidding opium 
had clearly not been a problem for the British when they could be 
subverted; Britain had been more concerned with loosening the regulations 
on foreign trade in general. Now, with Hong Kong a fully British port and 
five more cities open to Westerners, China was truly part of the informal 
empire. Through casually unleashing a destructive substance on a 
sequestered population, Britain had drawn the attention and retribution of 
the Chinese government. Now, with their victory in the lopsided war, 
Britain forced China into an economic relationship with them and 
expanded the Empire even further. 
Historiography reveals a distinct rift in opinions surrounding the 
causes of the First Opium War during its immediate aftermath and into the 
early twentieth century. Dr. Tan Chung attests to this in his book China 
and the Brave New World, stating: “Controversy on this conflict had 
started even before the war ended.”46 Most of the debate centers on the 
                                                             
45 Summary of the terms of the treaty drawn form Gregory Blue, “Opium for 
China: The British Connection,” in Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-
1952, ed. Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2000): 34-35. 
46 Tan Chung, China and the Brave New World (Durham: Carolina 
Academic Press, 1978), 1. 
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nomenclature; many of those writing at the time of the war, including both 
British and American scholars, disliked the term “Opium War.” They 
believed the war resulted largely from the culture clash between 
imperialistic Britain and reclusive China, saying that China’s ingrained 
feeling of cultural superiority made them antagonistic to British traders and 
explorers.47 Some were disinclined to identify the introduction of the 
opium trade by the British as the cause of the conflict on any level. As 
studies regarding the war progressed, scholars began developing a more 
balanced perspective. Many modern authors began condemning the work 
of the earlier writers as Eurocentric and revisionist, saying they were 
simply trying to justify British exploitation of the Chinese. In all of these 
works, the question of opium and where it fit in the causation of this 
conflict was one of the predominant questions. 
In a lecture to the Massachusetts Historical Society in 1841, John 
Quincy Adams pinpointed the kowtow specifically as one of the chief 
causes of the war. In his words, the issues were primarily caused by the 
Chinese view that “in all their intercourse with other nations…their 
superiority must be implicitly acknowledged, and manifested in 
humiliating forms.”48 In a brief historiographical essay, Far East scholar 
Tan Chung identified Adams as the initiator of the academic controversy 
surrounding the causes of the Opium Wars.49 Adams certainly stated his 
opinions concerning the origin of the conflict in no uncertain terms: 
It is a general, but I believe altogether mistaken opinion, 
that the quarrel is merely for certain chests of opium 
imported by British merchants into China, and seized by 
the Chinese government for having been imported contrary 
to law. This is a mere incident to the dispute; but no more 
the cause of the war, than the throwing overboard of the tea 
in Boston Harbor was the cause of the North American 
revolution.50 
Although perhaps overstated, Adams’s point merits consideration, 
particularly considering the extent of the obvious cultural and political 
47 Ibid., 1 
48 Adams lecture, 281. 
49 Chung, 1.  
50 Adams lecture, 281. 
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conflicts between China and Britain from the beginning of their diplomatic 
interactions.51 
The debate continued in the decades following the First Opium 
War, varying in conclusion but always revolving around the opium issue. 
Chung’s China and the Brave New World provided a historiographical 
essay in which he discussed the causes of the war. He presented three 
existing theories regarding the nature of the war: a cultural war, a trade 
war, or an opium war.52 Chung himself wrote in order to “revitalize the 
opium-war perspective” and provide a rebuttal against the other two 
theories, in direct contrast to Adams’s cultural theory.53 Carl Trocki’s 
Opium, Empire, and the Global Political Economy examined the economic 
consequences of the opium trade and argued that, rather than extending the 
reach of the British Empire, opium made the Empire possible. This 
represented the “trade war” perspective of the three outlined by Tan 
Chung. Among Trocki’s many emphatic statements concerning the issue of 
opium trafficking, this may have been the boldest: “I argue here that 
without the drug, there probably would have been no British Empire.”54 He 
suggested that without the revenues from the opium trade the British would 
have been unable to finance their colonial ventures. As evidenced by the 
body of scholarship surrounding this conflict, researchers have often 
disputed the true cause of the First Opium War. 
The war left an undeniable mark on Chinese society, particularly 
through the terms of the Treaty of Nanking and the development of their 
foreign trade. For the British, however, it was simply another chapter in the 
development of Empire. Nothing significantly changed for the ordinary 
British at home; they continued to drink their tea as China’s foreign policy 
was being turned upside down. This could have influenced Britain’s casual 
imperialistic attitude: their various spheres of influence lay so far removed 
from everyday life that it became easy to approach these foreign 
interactions in a more cavalier manner than they otherwise might have, had 
they taken place closer to home. Indeed, the war began primarily because 
the British felt that their pride and supremacy had been challenged. They 
                                                             
51 Adams’s ideas were met with some uncertainty and opposition even in his 
own time (Josiah Quincy, Memoirs of the Life of John Quincy Adams (Boston: 
Crosby, Nichols, Lee and Company, 1860): 336. 
52Chung, 3. 
53Ibid., 12. 
54 Trocki, xiii. 
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believed China had encroached on their jurisdiction by attempting to 
administer justice on British citizens, while China believed the British 
were trespassing foreign barbarians who should have been kept out of the 
country. Both sides had become too blinded by both perceived and genuine 
wrongs to attempt diplomatic reconciliation any longer. Through an 
examination of these factors it becomes clear that, although the opium 
trade was indeed the catalyst for the war, the true causes ran much deeper 
than the opium problem in itself—deeper, in fact, than economics in 
general. This was a collision of ideologies and attitudes, caused at its true 
roots by the relentless nationalism of one country, which blinded them to 
the human cost of their actions; and by the obstinate isolationism of the 
other in a world that was rapidly becoming more internationally connected 
than it had ever been before. 
